The Spatial Approach to the Party Mandate

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Abstract

This article applies spatial theory to the question of the party mandate. The party mandate model provides a system of linkage between citizen's preferences and parliamentary and governmental politics. Existing approaches to the party mandate focus on parties' governmental mandate: do parties enact their pledges? Instead, the spatial approach looks at the representative aspect of the party mandate: how parties represent in parliament. This allows a more inclusive analysis of parties' mandates as well as an evaluation of opposition parties' records. The spatial approach is connected to Pitkin's idea that representation is an 'institutionalized arrangement'. Thus, it focuses on the congruence of the electoral and parliamentary party competition rather than the record of individual parties. Analysis of recent elections and parliaments in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands reveals that the spatial approach offers the ability to analyze different political systems and can uncover differences between government and opposition and front- and backbenchers. Contrary to the findings of earlier studies, this study reveals that the party mandate model does not only apply to government parties and to Westminster style democracies.

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Parties' election manifestos have become longer and more detailed over the last few decades. The first few post-war Conservative manifestos were personal messages of the party leader focusing mainly on foreign policy, while the Tories' most recent manifesto totaled over 25,000 words and detailed many specific policy plans. The good thing about manifestos is that they indicate what parties want, providing voters with a substantively meaningful electoral choice. Of course, for this system to work parties' behaviour after the election should be in line with the policies in their manifestos. Parties have to fulfil their electoral mandate. As the role of manifestos in election campaigns has become more prominent, scholarly interest in the fulfilment of the party mandates has also increased.[1]

This article presents a novel approach to the question of the party mandate, in which the party mandate is studied through the lens of spatial theory. This 'spatial approach' measures party mandate fulfilment by looking at the congruence between the electoral and parliamentary party competition. It complements the existing approaches by looking at the 'party mandate model' as a system rather than the aggregate of individual parties' promises. In addition, it provides a test for both government as well as opposition parties' mandate fulfilment. Existing approaches effectively limit the analysis of mandate fulfilment to government parties. They look at the enactment of pledges by governments or government spending decisions. It is to be expected that opposition parties fail to get many of their pledges put into government policy - they are after all in opposition. The mandate fulfilment test for opposition parties is not whether governments enact their pledges, but whether they stick with their manifesto policies in parliament. By comparing parties' policy stances during the election with their parliamentary stances, the spatial approach offers a way to study the electoral mandates of both government and opposition parties.

Previous studies of the party mandate found that mandate fulfilment is relatively high in most countries.[2] This does, however, run contrary to the popular belief that parties do not do what they promise.[3] For example, only 7% of the respondents in the Dutch Parliamentary Election survey (partially or fully) agrees with the statement that 'Politicians keep their promises'.[4] Very few people in Britain believe that the major party that they did not vote for honours its electoral commitments.[5] Is this stark contrast the result of the way in which the party mandate is conceptualized and fulfilment is measured or is there a genuine gap between reality and people's perspectives?

This article discusses the existing approaches to the party mandate, analyzes their limitations and builds on their strengths to develop a new 'spatial approach'. This approach will be illustrated by examples from Britain and the Netherlands. By drawing from the different institutional context in these countries — one is a majoritarian, the other a consensus democracy[6]—, it demonstrates that a spatial approach of the party mandate is well suited to explore the differences between countries that are very different from an institutional perspective. Whereas it has been argued that majoritarian de-

mocracies show higher levels of party mandate fulfilment than consensus democracies,[7] this article will show that from a system-level perspective the party mandate model works equally well in both types of countries. This has important implications for the debate on the merits of various types of democratic institutions. The spatial approach also provides new insights in the working of the electoral and parliamentary competition, most importantly in the positions of governments, frontbenchers and backbenchers in majoritarian parliaments.

1 Parties, representation and the mandate

In the classic party mandate model, 'the doctrine of responsible party government' two parties compete for government.[8] If both parties present (a) distinguishable manifestos to the public, (b) voters cast their vote for the party of which they like the manifesto the best, and (c) parties implement these manifestos, there is a linkage between the preferences of the voters and the policy of the government.[9] With only two parties, one of them will receive an absolute majority of the vote which guarantees majority support for the winning parties' manifesto. In real-world politics, however, there are usually more than two parties and it is not guaranteed that one party will receive a majority of the vote. Even in countries with first-past-the-post electoral systems, this is an exception rather than rule. Therefore, thinking of the party mandate model as the 'popular authorization' of a particular government program is problematic.

Alternatively, the party mandate model can be thought of as a model of representation. The mandate serves as an *ex ante* control mechanism in the representative relationship between voters and parties.[10] It is a way for voters to influence future behaviour of their representatives: voters support a party that they agree with and parties fulfil this mandate. This system does not require that one party wins an overall majority. Thus, instead of looking at the *government* mandate, this article takes a *party* mandate perspective.

In the context of the party mandate, authorization takes place by means of a policy program. This policy program is drafted by the party itself. The 'program' normally has the form of an election manifesto, but it can also consist of party leader speeches, leaflets, or pamphlets. Many scholars study election manifestos because these documents give a good overview of parties' policy priorities and positions.[11] By choosing a party, a voter supports its program (or at the very least he does not greatly object to it). The party, in turn, is required to uphold this program. The question is, however, what that exactly entails: when does a party 'uphold' his party manifesto and fulfil its mandate?

Existing studies look at the party mandate either as a list of pledges that need to be fulfilled (the 'pledge approach') or party issue priorities that need to be translated into spending priorities (the 'saliency approach'). The pledge approach provides an intuitive answer to the question when a mandate is ful-

filled: a party fulfils its mandate when it fulfils its manifesto pledges.[12] Thus, the object of comparison is the pledge and the fulfilment test is whether these pledges are enacted (see table 1). Manifestos generally contain a reasonably large number of pledges. If parties manage to fulfil what they promise to the voters, they fulfil their electoral mandate. The party mandate is acquired in the electoral arena: here voters must make a choice for a party. The arena where parties have to act upon their mandate, what I call the representation-acting arena, is the government. As far as the pledge approach goes, the test of mandate fulfilment is whether *governments* do what parties promised during the election campaign. Manifesto pledges are compared to government policy: pledges are only enacted when the government makes decisions in line with the promise. The level of comparison of the pledge approach is the party-level. The outcome of pledge studies is that a particular party fulfilled so and so much of its pledges.

The pledge approach is very straightforward: parties make pledges and they have to fulfil them. In practice, pledge researchers have found that there is a need to specify exactly what qualifies as a pledge: only pledges that start with 'we promise...' or 'we will' (hard pledges) or also more vaguely worded promises?[13] Pledge fulfilment is another issue that researchers have looked at carefully. In reality, many pledges are fulfilled only to a certain extent. How to deal with those instances has been an important issue for researchers in the pledge tradition.

Pledge fulfilment studies find that levels of pledge enactment are in fact reasonably high, up to 80 per cent for government parties in Britain, 60 per cent for government parties in the Netherlands and just over 40 per cent for government parties Ireland.[14] Fulfilment levels are lower for opposition parties, which is to be expected as the fulfilment test is whether pledges have been translated into *government* policy, over which opposition parties arguably have little control.

The most important alternative for the pledge approach of the party mandate is the saliency approach which was developed using the manifesto data of the Comparative Manifesto Project.[15] It makes use of the saliency theory of political competition. Saliency theory argues that parties compete by selectively emphasizing certain issues rather than taking different issue positions.[16] Parties cannot simply adopt any position they want: they have to take into account their previous positions and make sure that its package of policies is not regarded as (too) inconsistent by voters. What parties can do, however, is downplaying (unpopular) issues and emphasizing popular issues to change their electability. The result is that parties seem to 'talk past each other', i.e. instead of criticizing the free market, parties will more likely support a government-led economy. And if parties are against strict environmental regulations, they will simply keep (relatively) quiet about the issue. As a result, one will not find parties in direct opposition on issues, but emphasizing one (e.g. free market policies) or another (government-run schemes) set of policies which are only indirectly in opposition.

Table 1: *Approaches to the party mandate*

	Pledge approach	**Saliency approach**	**Spatial approach**
Object of comparison	Pledge	Emphasis (saliency) of issues	Party issue saliency and position
Fulfilment test	Enactment	Correspondence with spending	Similarity in two arena's
Representation-acquiring arena	Elections	Elections	Elections
Representation-acting arena	Government	Government	Parliament and/or Government
Level of comparison	Party level	Party level	Party level & Party-system level

Saliency theory argues that positions are of lesser importance than emphasizing issues. Pledges are not very important for the electoral competition between parties. Instead, one should look at the different emphases of issues by parties. The object of comparison is issue saliency: how important an issue is to a party (see table 1). The question is to what extent party manifesto agendas influence the government policy agenda. More specifically, Klingemann et al. study the predictive power of manifesto issue saliency for government spending in the corresponding issue areas.[17] One would expect that if parties talk more about, for example, education (especially the parties that get to form the government), governments would also spend more on education policy. The representation-acquiring and representation-acting arena are similar to those in the pledge approach: elections and government respectively. Enactment of the mandate depends on what the government does, or in this case, what the government spends its money on.

Klingemann et al. find that congruence between issue saliency and government spending is more erratic than the mandate model would suggest.[18] The effect of manifesto saliency is in many cases not stronger when a party is in government. This means that opposition parties' manifesto saliency also has a strong relationship with actual government spending (the 'agenda model'). This is especially the case in Sweden, France and Britain. In other countries, such as the United States, Australia and Austria the government parties' saliency explains spending better than the opposition parties' saliency. For the Netherland and Belgium, the picture is erratic at best. There seems to be some support for the 'ideology' model in the Netherlands, meaning that

policy changes when the junior partner in government changes between liberals and social-democrats. However, policy actually moved to the *right* when the social-democrats were in government and to the *left* when the liberals were in government.[19]

The pledge and saliency approaches have provided relevant insights into party mandate fulfilment. However, their perspectives do limit the picture of the party mandate in a number of respects. These limitations relate to the representation-acting arena, the object of comparison and the fulfilment test identified by those approaches.

A major limitation of existing approaches lies in the representation-acting arena that they identify: the government. Studies in the pledge and saliency traditions look at the enactment of the mandate by governments.[20] Governments acting upon pledges is indeed an important link in the chain between people and policies: if governments do what people want, then the system appears to be functioning. However, by only focusing on government action to check mandate fulfilment, one ignores the process of representation that leads to this outcome. What governments do is not necessarily the 'ultimate measure' of policy linkage. Policy linkage occurs through a chain of delegation and each step in this chain is informative.[21] It is therefore important to be able to study this linkage in more detail, for example by comparing what parties say in election manifestos by what they say and do in parliament. This is especially relevant in systems with multi-party government, because the link between the mandate and the outcome (government enactment of manifesto pledges) is not at all straightforward. While some might argue that this lack of straightforwardness shows that the mandate model does not work in coalition systems, I argue that it merely shows that the pledge approach to the party mandate model is less applicable to these systems and that it leaves many dynamics unexplored.

Taking government policies as the test of party mandate fulfilment neglects opposition parties' mandates. I argued above that the party mandate model should be thought of as a model of representation, rather than as a model of electing a particular government program. In this view, not only the government have a mandate, as was acknowledged by John Major: "Although the Government have a mandate, so do Opposition Members".[22] This mandate is not to implement certain policies in government, but to strive for the implementation of policy proposals in parliament, or at least to voice these policies. After all, opposition party voters have supported its manifesto and can be expecting opposition along the lines of that manifesto. Many parties that are not likely to face the duty of government do write manifestos. Voters of these parties cannot expect these manifestos to be fully *implemented*, but the least they could expect that their party *behaves* according to the principles laid out in the manifesto. One long-term opposition party in the Netherlands put it like this:

> Using this booklet, you can in many instances approximate how we want to and shall act in Parliament.[23]

The pledge approach has some particular issues. First, it takes the pledge as the object of comparison a thereby reduces a party manifesto to a list of policy pledges. Manifestos provide insights in parties' policy plans. Pledges are the most concrete expression of these plans. However, the manifesto does also provide insights into the more general position of a party on particular policy issues beyond that of the specific pledge. For example, if a party stresses the importance of the environment and pledges to invest more into green energy in its manifesto, its voters would most likely be discontented when that party started to argue in favour of building environmentally-unfriendly coal plants, as did the Dutch Labour party after the 2006 elections. In this case, a party has not broken its pledge (it may even have acted upon it), but one cannot say that it has fulfilled its mandate. Manifestos raise expectations about how a party will behave in parliament beyond the specific pledges that they make.

The instances where the mandate goes beyond specific pledges are ubiquitous. First of all, the political agenda changes over time and new issues may arise that parties did not discuss in their manifestos. In fact, this happens all the time, as new real-world situations arise. Although these new cases are often not directly related to a pledge, in most cases they are related to the more general position of a party on an issue and are therefore still relevant in terms of the party mandate. When prime minister Blair decided to invade Iraq in 2003, he did not break a single election pledge. However, this course of action seemed to be at odds with the policy direction envisaged in the manifesto, which spoke about "reducing international conflict", "effective inspections against the development of chemical and biological weapons" and repeatedly argues in favour of dialog between Britain, the US and Russia.[24] Or maybe the phrase "We recognize the new dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the need to combat them" should have been taken more literally? This is to illustrate that looking at pledge enactment may sound straightforward, but is really rather complicated when dealing with real-world examples, as is acknowledge by those who study pledges.[25] However, even if circumstances change, the general issue positions put forward by parties in their manifestos can be compared with the general issue positions and actions of these parties in parliament. People look further than the exact pledges of parties and so should researchers.[26]

There are also many instances where policy proposals are more specific than the manifestos or concern issues that manifestos do not explicitly deal with. Rose estimates that about 90 per cent of government policy actually originates from within ministerial departments, not manifestos.[27] Unless these policies do directly oppose a pledge, taking the mandate to be a list of pledges completely ignores the majority of actual policies. The comparison is one-sided: it checks whether pledges are enacted, but not whether what is enacted has been pledged. One could defend this by saying that the mandate is completely free when it comes to issues that parties do not make pledges

on. However, this is undesirable from a normative point of view, because it would make pledge-making a highly strategic business. It would also severely weaken the linkage function of the mandate, because the mandate will only provide linkage for a very limited set of very specific pledges. The mandate is thus in need of some sort of two-way comparison: do parties enact their mandate *and* do their actions reflect their mandate?

Second, the pledge approach is susceptible to the strategic behaviour of parties concerning pledge-making. For example, if a party is likely to win an election, it has little reason to make many specific pledges. Instead, a vague manifesto containing broadly defined policy goals will probably be enough to win voters during the elections. This effect is likely to be stronger if pledges are heavily scrutinized, for example in countries where single party government is the norm. In such countries, the implementation of policy pledges is deemed relatively easy: the party that wins the election forms the government and implements its election pledges. It is therefore rather easy to blame a party that fails to do so. In coalition systems party can often hide behind the need for compromise, but a single-party government cannot use such an excuse. Exactly because of this, making pledges becomes a strategic game. On the one side, the competition between parties will likely increase the number of pledges, on the other side the scrutiny of pledge fulfilment after elections entices parties to limit the number of pledges they make. In coalition systems this dynamic is less strong, because there the manifesto has an additional function: it is the starting point of coalition negotiations, which does make it necessary for parties to define their positions prior to those negotiations.

Manifestos are strategic documents; they play an important role in electoral competition between parties. Any analysis of these documents needs to take this into account. My argument is that pledges are probably the most strategic elements of manifestos. By focusing so much on pledges, researchers might make the strategic element of the manifesto pledges even more important. The result of any analysis using this concept of the mandate depends on the extent to which parties choose to pledge on certain issues and not on other issues.

The saliency approach to the party mandate deals with some of these limitations of the pledge approach. First, as it looks at issue priorities in manifestos and in terms of spending, it avoids the problems of the changing agenda. It is in fact designed to study the congruence of the electoral and government policy agenda. Secondly, it recognizes parties' strategic considerations during manifesto-writing. It argues that parties will selectively emphasize issues, but also argues that parties do not have complete freedom in this respect. Parties will have to deal with the major issues of the day, although they might choose to refrain from putting forward specific pledges. However, by taking party issue saliency as its starting point and by focusing on government spending, the saliency approach introduces different limitations on the analysis of the party mandate. Klingemann et al.'s spending categories are rather broadly defined. This makes their comparison with manifesto

saliency less precise. Arguably, spending priorities *within* broadly defined areas such as social policy, can be very different between governments and parties.[28] Some parties might even devote large parts of their manifesto explaining how to cut spending in certain areas. In addition, many issues cannot easily be monetized, such as medical-ethical questions or matters that involve regulation rather than government spending.[29]

The saliency approach does provide steps in the right direction, as it is less susceptible to agenda change and parties' strategic considerations. However, its attachment to a particular theory of party competition does mean that its view of party mandate fulfilment is limited to issue saliency. Below, I develop a framework that combines the best elements of the pledge and saliency approaches. It allows for the analysis of parties' policy priorities both in terms of what they talk about (saliency) as well as in terms of what they say (positions).

2 The spatial approach

The spatial approach to the party mandate applies theories and concepts from the spatial analysis of politics to the question of the party mandate. Spatial analysis has been described as the 'workhorse theory of political science'.[30] It has many potential applications for political research, especially for those research questions that involve the estimation of the preferences of (political) actors. The idea is that these preferences can be modelled by positioning actors in a one or multi dimensional space. One of the simplest but very insightful ways in which this is used is the Left-Right dimension of political competition.[31] Many people are able to position themselves and political parties on this dimension, even though it is not always entirely clear what is meant by 'left' and 'right'. Other applications include multidimensional spaces in which parties are positioned according to their preferences.[32] The spatial approach uses this concept of the party position on issue dimensions or in a political space as the 'object of comparison' (see table 1).

Parties fulfil their electoral mandate if they take similar positions in the representation-acquiring arena and in the representation-acting arena. In practice this means that the party mandate is fulfilled when parties talk about the same issues and say similar things on these issues during the elections and in parliament or government. It builds on the idea that party competition can be subdivided in a number of broadly defined issues, such as health care, education, the environment and foreign policy, which have a relatively stable meaning in the short term. If parties' issue saliency and their issue position is stable between elections and parliament, the mandate is fulfilled. This manner of comparing ideas is not new in research on representation: it is indeed a rather common way to measure policy linkage between representatives and their constituents.[33] In a similar fashion, one can compare the positions of parties on issues during elections and in parliament (or in government).

This perspective on the concept of the party mandate solves the most im-

portant problems of the pledge and saliency approaches. It can be used to compare electoral with parliamentary positions of parties, but also to compare electoral positions of parties with the position of the government. It also allows to look at both the mandate of government as well as opposition parties. Furthermore, because it involves comparing parties' saliency and positions on broadly defined issues, it can deal with situations where the policy agenda changes. In addition, one can look at the overall saliency of issue dimensions: if parties start talking about completely different issues in parliament than they did in government that suggests that something is severely wrong with the representational process.

Because it is called the *party* mandate model, the existing approaches have looked at the mandate at the party level, i.e. 'Labour makes and fulfils a pledge' or the 'Conservatives attach a certain level of saliency to an issue'. Whether they fulfil their mandate only depends on their own behaviour. Existing approaches thus ignore the fact that mandates are formulated in a multi-party context. The mandate model works because voters select one party over another. From a societal perspective, the most important question about the mandate is not whether each party separately fulfils its mandate, but if the parliamentary policy competition as a whole is similar to the electoral competition:

> Political representation is primarily a public, institutionalized arrangement involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex ways of large-scale social arrangements. What makes it representation is not any single action by any one participant, but the over-all structure and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people.[34]

This perspective takes the party system as the level of analysis, instead of the party. Essential to the party mandate as a system of representative government is that the structures of the electoral and parliamentary party competition are congruent. Congruence involves firstly that similar issue dimensions define the space of competition, for example that socio-economic issues are important in both the electoral and parliamentary competition. Congruence also involves that two parties that take similar positions in the electoral competition, take similar positions in the parliamentary competition. For example, if Labour and the Liberal democrats have a similar position in the electoral space of competition, their position in the parliamentary space should also be alike. On the other hand, parties that present very different policy proposals during the elections, should also be very different (in terms of policy) in parliament. If this party system-level requirement is fulfilled, the choice a voter makes between parties during the elections has arguably been informative of parties' different positions in parliament. This article's approach builds on earlier studies that have compared the position of the median voter with that of the median legislator.[35] It extents the 'median voter'-type analysis, by studying the congruence of all parties' positions before and after elections as well as how similar the properties of the spaces of

pre- and post-electoral competition are, in terms of their dimensionality and how issues are related [36].

The spatial analysis of the party mandate can be used both at the party level as well as at the party system level. The party-level analysis looks at the similarity of individual parties' positions (on issue dimensions) before and after elections. This requires an absolute measure of party policy positions on issue dimensions, because one has to be able to say that a party 'has changed its position by so-and-so-much'. There is, however, discussion whether this kind of measure is available when policy agendas are changing over time.[37] From a party system perspective on the party mandate, such an absolute measure of party positions is not required. Instead, one can rely on the relative positions of parties and construct 'spaces of competition' from these positions, spatial representations of parties' positions in a particular policy arena, i.e. elections or parliament.[38] The structures of these spaces can be compared, even if the underlying issue dimensions are not necessarily identical for the two arenas of competition. The advantage is that one is able not just to study whether parties remain in the same position, but also whether the properties of the space itself remain the same. Are the same issue dimensions relevant in both the electoral and parliamentary arena? Is it possible to collapse all relevant issue dimension into a single Left-Right 'super issue' or is the competition essentially multidimensional? This is exactly what is required for an *institutional* analysis of the party mandate model. The congruence of these spaces can be used as a party system-level measure of the party mandate model [39].

3 Comparing spaces of competition

The spatial approach to the party mandate allows for many different ways of operationalizing the concept 'party position'. Perhaps the straightforward way of studying the party mandate in a spatial manner involves content analysis of manifestos and parliamentary speeches. While it is also possible to study voting behaviour in parliament within the framework of the spatial approach to the party mandate,[40] I opted to analyze parliamentary speech. The reason is that voting is only the conclusion of a long parliamentary procedure and oftentimes depend on tactical considerations. For example, a single party may table a disproportionally large number of amendment and motions on one particular issue for tactical reasons (agenda setting, filibustering), which would 'distort' the overall picture of how parties represent. Also, whether a party tables a parliamentary motion or proposal is in many cases subject to the policy position of the government. Parliamentary speeches are most directly comparable to manifestos and capture an important aspect of the act of parliamentary representation.

By means of manual[41] or computerized content analysis[42] one can construct a spatial model of the electoral and a parliamentary party competition. This article shows how the computerized analysis of party election manifestos and

parliamentary speech can be used to construct these spatial models of party competition. As an example, I used a recent election and subsequent parliament in Britain (2001-2005) and the Netherlands (2003-2006), because these provide two different political and party systems.[43] A three step procedure was used to construct spatial representations of the party competition from political text.

First, each paragraph of the manifestos and the parliamentary speeches was categorized into a particular issue category, for example the Economy or Foreign Affairs[44]. A dictionary-based classification procedure was used. For each issue category I created a list of signal words ('dictionary'). I counted the occurrence of each issue category's signal words; a paragraph was classified according to which set of words appeared in it the most[45]. The reliability of these estimates is reasonable to good: a comparison of the computer estimates with a sample of manually classified paragraphs results in acceptable to good levels of computer-manual reliability (Krippendorff's alpha lies between 0.7 and 0.8).

The second step was to estimate party's issue positions for each of these issue categories. For this purpose, I applied Wordfish, a computer algorithm which can estimate parties' policy positions from the differences in parties' usage of words.[46] Essentially, parties with very dissimilar choice of words are estimated to have very different policy positions, while parties with similar choice of words are estimated to be closer to one another. The researcher does not have to provide information on what are 'left-wing' words and what are 'right-wing' words – the algorithm is designed to estimate this from the data[47]. Wordfish has been shown to work well for the estimation of party positions, both in manifestos as well as in parliament.[48] For each issue, a separate analysis was conducted, because different words play a role in the debates on, for example, Foreign Affairs than in the debates on the Economy. In addition, the Wordfish algorithm has been applied separately to the manifestos and the parliamentary debates, which ensures that the technique does not 'force' the electoral and parliamentary space to be similar.[49]. Thus, the application of Wordfish provided an estimate of each party's position on each issue dimension, both during the election campaign and in parliament.

Third, the policy positions were combined into one spatial representation of the political competition in each election and each parliament. These spaces of electoral and parliamentary party competition were estimated with classical multi-dimensional scaling (MDS).[50] Multi-dimensional scaling is a data reduction technique that allows to 'summarize' parties' positions on a number of separate issue dimensions in a low-dimensional figure. It is based on the (Euclidean) policy distances between parties[51]. Thus, instead of presenting parties' electoral and parliamentary positions on five or eight separate issue dimensions, the MDS results in one electoral and one parliamentary party space. In the cases presented here a two-dimensional multi-dimensional scaling solution was found to be most appropriate. The advantage of the spatial representation is that it allows the comparison of parties'

overall policy position before and after elections: it represents the configuration of parties that voters had to choose from (the electoral space) and the configuration of parties in the arena where the voters mandate was enacted (the parliamentary space). Additionally, one can compare how the different issues relate to each other: whether parties' positions on for example the Economy, strongly relate to those on Foreign Affairs or not, en whether this changes after the elections. Thus, using the spatial representations one cannot only look at the congruence of the structure of party positions before elections, but also at the congruence of the spaces themselves.

4 Results

Figure 1 presents the spaces of competition for the United Kingdom election of 2001 and the subsequent parliament. Parties' positions are indicated by the dots and the party labels. It is important to realize that the axes of these figures are in themselves meaningless, because of the multi-dimensional scaling procedure that was used. As a result, one could freely rotate the figures without any change in their meaning. To aid the visual comparison of the manifesto and parliamentary space, I have rotated the spaces so that parties' positions were as similar as possible (e.g. Labour is on the left in both figures); any remaining differences between parties' electoral and parliamentary positions can therefore be attributed to a change in their (relative) position. Another way to aid the interpretation of the spaces is by plotting the dotted lines that represent parties' orderings on the separate issue dimensions. Parties' positions on these issue dimensions can be approximated by drawing a line perpendicular to the issue dimension of interest through the party position. This way, one can for example see that the ordering of parties on the (electoral) Environment dimension is: Liberal Democrats - Conservatives - Labour[52].

The electoral space of competition, based on textual analysis of the manifestos, shows a divide between the incumbent government party, Labour, and the two opposition parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals. Whereas this may seem at odds with the ideological positions of the parties, the analysis of the manifestos showed many differences in word usage between government and opposition parties. British manifestos do indeed contain a lot of attacks and defence of the incumbent's record. Of course, if one would be interested in purely ideological policy position, a different method of content analysis could be applied. However, from a mandate perspective it is sensible to look at the electoral message parties send to their voters.

For the analysis of the parliamentary space of competition, I distinguished between the main parties' front- and backbenches.[53] Whereas the Labour frontbench (the government) is located more towards the centre of the parliamentary space, its backbenchers are located rather towards the outskirts of the space. The Conservatives benches display the opposite pattern. While the backbenchers take a relatively moderate position, the Conservative

Figure 1: *Spaces of party competition in the United Kingdom, 2001-2005*



Note: Lab = Labour, Con = Conservative, Lib = Liberal Democrats, FB = Frontbench, BB = Backbench. Labels are relative to party size.

frontbench distances itself the most from the Labour benches. The Liberal Democrats have moved towards the centre of the space (compared to their manifesto position).[54]

As explained above, Wordfish distinguishes between party positions on the issue dimensions by looking at differences in word usage. To estimate the 'substantive' meaning of an issue dimension, one can look at the word parameters. These parameters capture how informative a particular word is for a particular issue position. In other words: which words are more often used by the parties on the left of the dimensions and which words are more often used by parties on the right? One example is the Foreign Affairs and Defence dimension, which showed the following ordering for parties' manifesto positions: Liberal Democrats - Labour - Conservative. Words that were used relatively a lot by the party on the left (the Liberal Democrats) were: enforce, staff, public, regime, committ-, fair, assist-, institut-.[55] The Conservatives on the right used other words a lot: opt-out, singl-, kingdom, hong, kong. This suggests that issues related to the European Union dominated this debate in the manifestos, with the Liberal Democrats on the pro-Europe side and the Tories on the anti-Europe side. In parliament, however, the ordering of parties was different: Labour Backbench - Labour Frontbench - Conservative Backbench - Liberal Democrats - Conservative Frontbench. Words used on the Labour-side of the dimension were: erdogan, hawk, plutonium, bombard, trade-off, haliburton. Popular words on the right were: justic-, overseen, obstinacy, reliant, goldsmith, giscard. Here, words relating to the European Union play a much smaller role, but words that are used when criticizing the government are used a lot by opposition parties: overseen, obstinacy, justic-. Thus the change of parties' positions is not only related to the positions they take, but also to what the main issues of conflict in a particular arena were.

From the perspective of the party mandate model, the most important question is how congruent the two spaces are. By comparing the relative positions of the parties in the electoral space with those in the parliamentary space, one can measure the level of congruence between them. The general 'Labour versus Conservative' pattern of competition is apparent in both spaces of competition. The Liberals are in a more centrist position in parliamentary space than in the electoral space. They seem to have lost their 'unique position' on some issues: in the manifesto space parties are organized in a triangular pattern, while the parliamentary space rather shows a single line of parties. This suggests that on some of the issues where the Liberals were contra posed to the two big parties (Environment, Government Operations, Foreign Affairs and Defence), the general left-right pattern has prevailed in parliament. This finding seems to be at odds with a study of the voting behaviour of the Liberal Democrats in the 2001-2005, which shows that they more often side with the Conservative opposition than with the Labour government.[56] One explanation is that parliamentary procedure forces the Liberal Democrats to choose between Labour and the Conservatives in the division lobby, while they might actually disagree with both positions.[57]

While their choice of words is rather moderate in parliament (although it is more similar to the Conservative backbenchers' word usage than to that of the government), they only have a binary choice when voting. It may therefore very well be that the Liberal Democrats take a different position in the representative act of speaking than in the representative act of voting. This is certainly a question that deserves further attention, which could very well be done within the framework of the spatial approach.[58]

The British government is positioned rather towards the centre of the policy space. This is, however, likely to be partly, but certainly not fully, dependent on the measurement technique, which corrects for the constitutionally different position of the government in Britain [59]. Contrarily, the opposition front bench is positioned as the outskirts of the space. Apparently, patterns of accommodation on the part of the government and confrontation on the part of the opposition are not foreign to British politics.

For the Netherlands I analyzed the 2003 election and the subsequent parliament (see figure 2). This analysis illustrates that the spatial approach to the party mandate can be used for different types of democratic regimes. Just as in the British case I analyzed parties' manifestos and party members' parliamentary speeches on a number of issue dimensions; these data were used to construct a spatial representation of the party competition in the election and the parliament. For the Dutch case I did not distinguish between frontbench and backbenchers, because this distinction is not made in the Dutch parliamentary practice: each member of parliament is expected to speak on his party's behalf (unless specifically stated otherwise, which is a rare occasion). The analysis concerns the parliamentary parties, because these are the most obvious counterparts to the parties in the election.

In the electoral space of competition, three left-wing parties (Socialist Party (SP), GreenLeft (GL), Labour (PvdA)) are contra posed with four right-wing parties (Christian Democrats (CDA), Liberal Party (VVD), Christian Union (CU), Political Reformed Party (SGP)), with the Democrats 66 (D66) and the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) taking positions in the centre. This left-right dimension mainly reflects parties' positions on the Economy, Health Care and Education and Democracy and Civil Rights. A second dimension also plays a role, separating the LPF from all other parties. This supports the findings of other authors who argue that a second progressive-conservative or 'new' cultural dimension plays a role in many European party systems.[60] On this dimension, parties with positive views on European cooperation and economic globalization are confronted with those who perceive these developments as a threat and argue that national achievements, such as the welfare state and the national cultural identity should be protected from international interference. At the same time, figure 2 suggests that the first 'economic' dimension is most important in the Dutch system, while the second dimension mainly separates the LPF from the others, due to the fact that it is right-wing on some issues and more centrist on others.[61]

The positions of parties in the parliamentary space of competition are

Figure 2: *Spaces of party competition in the Netherlands, 2003-2006*



Note: Labels are relative to party size.

quite similar to those in the electoral space: SP, GL and PvdA on the left, VVD, CDA, CU and SGP on the right and D66 and LPF somewhere in the centre. However, both the LPF and D66 are positioned closer to the three left-wing parties in parliament than in the electoral space. This is especially remarkable for D66, which participated in the centre-right government coalition (CDA, VVD and D66) between 2003 and 2006. Whereas the other coalition parties are positioned almost on top of each other in the parliamentary space, the junior coalition party D66 is positioned further away from its coalition partners in parliament than it was during the election campaign. In terms of the relevant issue dimensions, there is quite a high degree of congruence: the issue dimensions Economy and Health Care and Education are tied strongly to the horizontal plane in the figure, while Environment and Foreign Affairs and Defence is plotted at a similar angle as in the electoral space. Remarkably, the four remaining issue dimensions show the LPF to be closer to the left-wing parties than to the right wing parties, while the LPF is generally regarded as right-wing. One explanation is that the LPF shares 'opposition word use' with the left-wing parties. Furthermore, the LPF's word choice is generally rather unorthodox, which does influence the inductive Wordfish analysis.

All in all, the structure of the spaces of electoral and parliamentary competition are quite similar in the 2003-2006 parliament. Differences that do exist relate to government versus opposition dynamics. The left-wing opposition parties are positioned more to the left and the two main government parties are closer in the parliamentary space than they already were in the electoral space. Opposition parties and government parties show both relatively congruent positions between elections and parliament.

5 Discussion and conclusion

The empirical analysis of a British and a Dutch election and subsequent parliament shows that the spatial approach is able to provide a different perspective on the party mandate. The British 2001-2005 case illustrates an incongruence between the pro- and anti-government rhetoric of the election manifestos and the traditional Left-Right pattern in the parliamentary debates. The manifesto space is clearly split between the incumbent Labour government and the opposition challengers. In parliament, however, there is a traditional left-right distinction, with the Liberal Democrats in the centre of the space. This reveals that congruence between the electoral and parliamentary party competition is not perfect. Because it relates to the structure of the competition between parties rather than the enacment of individual pledges, this sort of incongruence would not have been observed by other approaches to the party mandate. The spatial approach to the party mandate is thus able to reveal different patterns than the existing approaches. Another finding in the British case is that the position of the government is more accommodating than is usually assumed. The government's parliamentary position is not just a translation of the party manifesto. A lot of parliamentary business

originates from Whitehall, rather than Party headquarters. Despite the programmes for change that parties present during election time, governments are in a sense also defenders of the status quo.

A noteworthy advantage of the spatial approach is its ability to look at governing *as well as* opposition parties' mandate fulfilment, which is most obvious in the analysis of the Dutch 2003-2006 case. While existing studies show that government parties are better at translating their pledges in government policy, the spatial approach shows that in terms of the *parliamentary* mandate of parties, the opposition parties do at least as well as the government parties.[62] Opposition parties do not simply oppose everything that government parties say. Their parliamentary policy stance is a reflection of their position in the electoral space of competition. Relative positions of parties have to a large degree been preserved between the electoral and parliamentary space of competition.

While the analysis of the British and Dutch cases shows only one way to operationalize the spatial approach to the party mandate[63], it demonstrates that the approach offers a highly flexible yet insightful way of looking at the party mandate. It allows the inclusion of different sources (manifestos, parliamentary debates), permits the study of both government and opposition parties' mandates, front bench and backbenchers in the British case, and includes a comparison of both the whole manifesto as well as the whole corpus of parliamentary speech. Obviously, the analysis of only two elections and the subsequent parliaments does not allow generalization beyond the two specific cases. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that the *spatial approach* is able to shed light on other aspects of party mandate fulfilment than the existing approaches. It offers a more inclusive comparison of party mandates by studying political representation at the party system level.

Contrary to findings of previous studies, this article shows that the party mandate model does not only provide linkage in countries with a majority or plurality electoral systems.[64] The model also provides linkage between citizens and parliamentary parties in countries with proportional representation.[65] Although this finding has to be confirmed by further analysis of a larger number of cases[66], it does challenge the assumption that majoritarian democracies provide clear mandates for governments and consensus democracies necessarily lead to vague compromise and lack of mandate fulfilment. This has implications for theories on the design of democratic institutions as well as the public debate on institutional reform, which is likely to revive in the wake of the planned referendum on voting reform in Britain.

Another reason to provide a new approach to the party mandate was the contradiction between low public trust in party mandate fufilment and previous' studies findings that in fact pledge fulfilment is reasonably high. By providing a more inclusive comparison of parties' issue positions, the spatial approach strengthens the argument put forward by research in the pledge and saliency traditions that mandate fulfilment is higher than many people expect.[67] This does not solve the 'paradox of party mandate research' (studies

show fair levels of fulfilment, while many people are convinced mandate fulfilment is low), but it does show that this paradox is not likely to be the result of the measurement technique but rather presents a gap between what the party mandate model delivers and what people expect.

Further research that more deeply explores the differences between countries with proportional electoral systems and those with majority/plurality systems is necessary to provide a better understanding of the substantive implications of the spatial approach to the party mandate. This type of research can also do more justice to the differences between government and opposition parties, between front bench and backbenchers and to the development of party mandate fulfilment over time.

Notes

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[2]Mansergh and Thomson, op. cit.; Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, op. cit.

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[4]Dutch Parliamentary Election Study. *Data File and Codebook (P1719)*. Dutch Data Archiving and Networking Services (DANS). Amsterdam, 2006.

[5]British Election Survey, 2005.

[6]A. Lijphart. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

[7]Mansergh and Thomson, op. cit.; R. Thomson. 'The Party Mandate. Election Pledges and Government Actions in the Netherlands, 1986-1998'. PhD thesis. RUG / UU / KUN: ICS, 1999; Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, op. cit.

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[13]Francois Petry and Benoît Collette. 'Measuring How Political Parties Keep Their Promises'. In: *Do They Walk Like They Talk*. Ed. by Louis M. Imbeau. New York: Springer, 2009, pp. 65–80.

[14]Mansergh and Thomson, op. cit.; Petry and Collette, op. cit.

[15]Michael J. Laver and Ian Budge. *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*. London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martins, 1992; Ian Budge et al. *Mapping policy preferences : estimates for parties, electors and governments, 1945-98*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Klingemann et al., op. cit.

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[17]Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, op. cit.; see also F. Petry. 'The Policy Impact of Canadian Party Programs - Public-Expenditure Growth and Contagion from the Left'. In: *Canadian Public Policy-Analyse De Politiques* 14.4 (1988), pp. 376–389; I. Budge and R. I. Hofferbert. 'Mandates and Policy Outputs - United-States Party Platforms and Federal Expenditures'. In: *American Political Science Review* 84.1 (1990), pp. 111–131; G. King et al. 'Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending'. In: *American Political Science Review* 87.3 (1993), pp. 744–750; F. Petry. 'Fragile Mandate - Party Programs and Public-Expenditures in the French-Fifth-Republic'. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 20.2 (1991), pp. 149–171; F. Petry. 'The Party Agenda Model - Election Programs and Government Spending in Canada'. In: *Canadian Journal of Political Science-Revue Canadienne De Science Politique* 28.1 (1995), pp. 51–84.

[18]Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, op. cit.

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[25]Royed, op. cit.; Mansergh and Thomson, op. cit.

[26]Naurin, op. cit.

[27]Rose, op. cit.

[28]Royed, op. cit.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Gary Cox. 'Introduction to the Special Issue'. In: *Political Analysis* 9.3 (2001), pp. 189–191, p. 189.

[31]I. Budge and J. Bara. 'Introduction: Content Analysis and Political Texts'. In: *Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments 1945-1998*. Ed. by I. Budge et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 1–18; Kenneth Benoit and Michael J. Laver. *Party policy in modern democracies*. London: Routledge, 2006; G. B. Powell. 'The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules'. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 42.12 (2009), pp. 1475–1497.

[32]Huib Pellikaan, Tom Van der Meer and Sarah L. De Lange. 'The Road from a Depoliticized to a Centrifugal Democracy'. In: *Acta Politica* 38.1 (2003), pp. 23–49; Kees Aarts and Jacques Thomassen. 'Satisfaction with democracy: Do institutions matter?' In: *Electoral Studies* 27.1 (2008), pp. 5–18; Benoit and Laver, op. cit.

[33]G. B. Powell. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000; Michael D. McDonald and Ian Budge. *Elections, parties, democracy : conferring the median mandate*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005; M. D. McDonald, S. M. Mendes and M. Kim. 'Cross-temporal and cross-national comparisons of party left-right positions'. In: *Electoral Studies* 26.1 (2007), pp. 62–75; G. B. Powell. 'Election laws and representative governments: Beyond votes and seats'. In: *British Journal of Political Science* 36.2 (2006), pp. 291–315; A. Blais and M. A. Bodet. 'Does proportional representation foster closer congruence between citizens and policy makers?' In: *Comparative Political Studies* 39.10 (2006), pp. 1243–1262; Matt Golder and Jacek Stramski. 'Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions'. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 54.1 (2010), pp. 90–106.

[34]Hanna Fenichel Pitkin. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967, pp. 221-222.

[35]McDonald and Budge, op. cit.

[36]Moreover, McDonald and Budge do not test whether parties take similar positions in the electoral and parliamentary arena, but rather study the influence of the institutional settings

on issue congruence, assuming that parties take the same position during elections and in parliament. ibid., p. 192.

[37]Pellikaan, Meer and De Lange, op. cit.; Budge and Bara, op. cit.

[38]Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori. 'Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies'. In: *Western European Party Systems: Continuity & Change*. Ed. by Hans Daalder and Peter Mair. London: SAGE Publications Inc, 1984, pp. 307–340.

[39]It should be noted that there could be an absolute incongruence between parties' pre-electoral and their post-electoral positions, for example if all parties would shift their policy position somewhat to the right, which would not show up in the party level analysis. There could be a similar mismatch between the supply side of politics (e.g. the policy packages that parties offer) and the demand side (the policy packages that voters actually want). While this would require a different type of study, it is an equally important aspect of the party mandate model. It could, for example, explain the rise of populist parties in Western Europe. I thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point.

[40]Keith T. Poole. *Spatial models of parliamentary voting*. Analytical methods for social research. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman and Douglas Rivers. 'The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data'. In: *American Political Science Review* 98 (2004), pp. 355–370.

[41]Pellikaan, Meer and De Lange, op. cit.; H. Kriesi et al. 'Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared'. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 45.6 (2006), pp. 921–956; Klingemann et al., op. cit.

[42]M. J. Laver and J. Garry. 'Estimating policy positions from political texts'. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 44.3 (2000), pp. 619–634; Laver, Benoit and Garry, op. cit.; Slapin and Proksch, op. cit.

[43]Lijphart, op. cit.

[44]I categorized into the twenty-odd categories of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP), which were then reduced to five broader categories in Britain and eight in the Netherlands. This merger of categories was necessary, because the number of word counts in some of the twenty CAP-categories was too low to arrive at robust estimates in the second step of the procedure. For the categories used in the CAP, please see UK Policy Agendas Project. *UK Topics Codebook*. 2010; G. Breeman et al. 'Political Attention in a Coalition System: Analysing Queen's Speeches in the Netherlands 1945-2007'. In: *Acta Politica* 44.1 (2009), pp. 1–27.

[45]Paragraphs that could not be classified in this way were assigned using a Linear Support Vector Machine (SVM), a computer algorithm that uses word usage patterns in the paragraphs that I did know the category of to predict the most likely category for the paragraphs that had remained unclasssified. See Rong-En Fan et al. 'LIBLINEAR: A Library for Large Linear Classification'. In: *Journal of Machine Learning Research* 9 (2008), pp. 1871–1874.

[46]Slapin and Proksch, op. cit.; Sven-Oliver Proksch and Jonathan B. Slapin. *WORDFISH: Scaling Software for Estimating Political Positions from Texts*. Version 1.3. `http://www.wordfish.org`. 2008.

[47]Specifically, Wordfish assumes that the number of times a word is used in a text can be estimated by a statistical model. The number of times a particular word is mentioned in a text is assumed to follow a poisson distribution, with parameter λ that is a function of four parameters: a parameter that captures the length of the text, a parameter that captures how often a word is mentioned overall (e.g. words like 'the' and 'an' are used more often than 'deficit'), a parameter that captures how informative the word itself is of the underlying issue dimension and a parameter that captures the position of the party that wrote the text. These four parameters are estimated by the Wordfish algorithm – they are chosen so that the predicted number of times each word was used in each text is as similar as possible to the observed number of times each word was used in each text.

[48]Slapin and Proksch, op. cit.; Proksch and Slapin, op. cit.

[49]For example, I do not assume that word usage is comparable between manifestos and parliamentary debates (cf. Laver, Benoit and Garry, op. cit.; Slapin and Proksch, op. cit.).

[50]Ingwer Borg and Patrick J.F. Groenen. *Modern Multidimensional Scaling*. Springer Series in Statistics. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1997.

[51]The Euclidean distance is calculated for each pair of parties by adding up the squared differences of their positions on each issue and taking the square root of this sum. The distance per issue had first been multiplied by the squared average issue saliency of that issues, which means that issues that matter more to parties contribute more to the overall policy distance and thus carry more weight in the analysis.

[52]The lines were fitted using the technique Property fitting (see Wouter Van der Brug. 'Where's the Party? Voters' perceptions of Party Positions'. Ph.D. Thesis. Amsterdam, 1997).

[53]A. King. 'Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations - Great-Britain, France, and West-Germany'. In: *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1.1 (1976), pp. 11–36.

[54]The Liberal Democrat parliamentary party group was too small, compared to the other parties, to distinguish between frontbenchers and backbenchers.

[55]The dashes indicates that this is a word stem. Words were stemmed so that usage of very similar words was regarded as the same, a common practice in computerized text analysis.

[56]Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart. *A long way from equidistance*. `http://www.revolts.co.uk/A long way from equidistance.pdf`, accessed 20 December 2010. 2008.

[57]Ibid., p. 5.

[58]Cf. Poole, op. cit.; Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, op. cit.

[59]The Wordfish model is first estimated without the government and the word parameters from this initial analysis are used to estimate the government's position. If one would not do this, one would find the government on one side of the political spectrum and all other parliamentary actors on the other side. This finding would arguably depend more on the constitutional position of the government than its policy position, which is also shown by inspecting the word parameters of such an analysis.

[60]G. Marks et al. 'Party competition and European integration in the East and West - Different structure, same causality'. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 39.2 (2006), pp. 155–175; Pellikaan, De Lange and Meer, op. cit.; H. Kriesi. 'Political mobilisation, political participation and the power of the vote'. In: *West European Politics* 31.1-2 (2008), pp. 147–168.

[61]This has been argued by Van der Brug et al., who show that the voters have a two-dimensional perspective on politics, but that the party competition is essentially best capture by a one-dimensional model. Wouter Van der Brug and Joost Van Spanje. 'Immigration, Europe and the 'new' cultural dimension'. In: *European Journal Of Political Research* 48.3 (2009), pp. 309–334.

[62]Mansergh and Thomson, op. cit.

[63]In addition, there are many other avenues for analyzing the data collected here, for example by calculating the distance between parties' electoral and parliamentary position (subject to a number of normalizing constraints). This would be particularly useful when comparing a larger number of cases, but would go beyond the more modest aims of this article.

[64]Idem, 'Election pledges, party competition, and policymaking'; Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, op. cit.

[65]Cf. Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*; idem, 'The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules'; Lijphart, op. cit.

[66]The analysis of six elections and subsequent parliaments in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom confirms this conclusion.

[67]Mansergh and Thomson, op. cit.; Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, op. cit.